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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Matters of migration and border control have been topics of political and societal controversy 
already from the time that today’s nation-states came into existence. Currently, however, the 
issue of immigration appears to have become more contentious than ever. Due to a variety of 
circumstances – war, destitution, societal unrest – hundreds of thousands of migrants from the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia are trying to reach the borders of the European Union, hoping 
for the opportunity to settle in one of the safe and affluent states that are part of it. Just like 
most modern nation-states, the EU as a whole seeks to limit the number of newcomers by 
practicing restrictive immigration policies.  
 As the number of immigrants at the European border continues to rise, the public 
debate about these policies is heating. On the one hand, it is argued that Europe cannot close 
its borders to those in need. On this view, such a practice constitutes an unfair protection of 
the wealth of those at the one side of the border, at the expense of the well-being of those at 
the other side. People who flee their home country should be enabled to live decent lives just 
as people born in safer and more affluent states, so it is contended. On the other hand, it is 
suggested that Europe has to take measures to restrict immigration in order to preserve the 
way of living that is valued so highly by its residents. From this perspective, large numbers of 
immigrants entering the EU could have detrimental consequences for the economy and public 
order throughout the Union. On the national level, it is feared that the flow of immigrants will 
endanger each member state’s distinctive cultural identity, as well as the values of solidarity 
and democracy that come along with it. 
 The discussion about immigration has figured prominently in the field of political 
theory as well. Positions on the issue have been developed from various philosophical 
perspectives, but here we focus on two opposing views, grounded in two distinct theoretical 
doctrines. First, we consider the position that offers an argument against policies of 
immigration restriction and that is associated with the philosophy of liberalism. Central to the 
liberal doctrine is the idea that all human beings are of equal moral worth. The state should 
thus treat them as such. The act of distinguishing between those persons inside the borders 
and those outside, that inevitably accompanies restrictive immigration practices, is therefore 
hard to justify from a liberal point of view (Kymlicka, 2001b). A further idea that is at the 
core of liberal thought, is the belief that the arbitrary circumstances that a person is born into 
should not determine the chances he has in life. Given the fact that the location of existing 
state borders has largely been determined by historical processes that were not subject to the 
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free choice of all those affected by them, these boundaries can be seen to establish one of 
those arbitrary contingencies (ibid.). Following this thought, the extensive consequences of 
the positioning of borders for the lives of individuals, sustained by the practice of immigration 
restriction, cannot be justified from a liberal perspective. As Joseph Carens (1987) puts it: 
“[c]itizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an 
inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like feudal birthright privileges, 
restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.” (p. 252)  
 The second position, on the contrary, provides an argument in favor of immigration 
restriction and springs from the philosophy of nationalism. The central thesis advanced by this 
doctrine is that national identities are not arbitrary contingencies, but in fact possess a special 
kind of moral value (Miller, 1995). They constitute “the collective identities that matter most 
to us; and it is essential to the stability of the state that these identities should be protected 
against subversion and transmitted to new generations of citizens” (p. 120).  From a 
nationalist perspective, it is therefore argued that a state may indeed be justified in preventing 
outsiders from entering in an attempt to protect the national identity that the community of 
insiders prefers to preserve. 
 From the brief sketch of these two opposing theoretical positions and the philosophical 
traditions that underlie them, there appears to be a tension between liberalism and nationalism 
when it concerns restrictive immigration policies. This tension seems to stem from a 
fundamental point of divergence between both doctrines. Whereas state borders appear to 
have no moral value within liberal thought, they tend to be constitutive of the national 
identities that occupy a central role within nationalist philosophy. Therefore, privileging a 
national culture, identity or community forms a practice that has no place in the doctrine of 
liberalism at first glance, but may in fact be morally required by the principles of nationalism. 
 However elementary this disparity may sound, it has not stopped philosophers from 
attempting to combine liberal and nationalist viewpoints. These attempts have resulted in the 
development of a theory that has become known as liberal nationalism, a philosophical 
rationale that is mainly associated with the works of David Miller and Will Kymlicka. At the 
core of liberal nationalist thought lies the idea that national identities are crucial to the 
fulfillment of the most fundamental ideals of liberalism. Both the autonomous life and well-
being of the individual and the functioning of some basic liberal egalitarian institutions – most 
notably the institutions of social justice and deliberative democracy – are said to rely upon the 
existence of a solid national identity (Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001b). Ultimately, this 
argument is employed to justify restrictive immigration policies for the sake of the 
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preservation of a nation-state’s distinctive identity. In this sense, liberal nationalism presents 
us with a potential solution to the alleged discordance between liberal and nationalist 
principles, as well as the asserted incompatibility of liberal values and immigration restriction. 
 However, liberal nationalism’s standpoint on immigration has not remained without 
criticism. A first category of critique concerns the liberal nationalist argument that individuals 
have an interest in the preservation of their national identity. Ryan Pevnick (2008) attempts to 
demonstrate that the function of national identity as a background against which individuals 
can make meaningful life choices may just as well be preserved without restrictive 
immigration policies. Besides, so he argues, the desire for cultural stability of the individual 
member of the national community is generally overridden by the interests of potential 
immigrants. A second pile of criticism is directed at the argument that the institutions of 
democracy and social justice are dependent upon the presence of a shared national identity. 
Together with Pevnick (2007), Arash Abizadeh (2002; 2006) challenges this claim from an 
empirical viewpoint. In addition, Pevnick (2007) argues that such an identity might just as 
well be revised so that immigrants are included in the national community as well. 
Furthermore, both authors contend that the conclusion that immigration should be restricted 
relies upon a dubious normative claim, favoring those already residing inside the state 
(Abizadeh, 2006; Pevnick, 2007). Lastly, Pevnick (2007) has tried to demonstrate that 
limiting immigration is not necessary if states allow for a “residence only” form of 
citizenship, that is less demanding than the all-encompassing kind of citizenship that Miller 
(2000) supports. 
 At the same time, liberal nationalists have not been sleeping and have provided a 
number of counterarguments to defend their theory against these and other objections. The 
past two decades have thus witnessed a vehement academic discussion on the force of the 
liberal nationalist logic and the corresponding position on immigration. The aim of the present 
research is to assess whether liberal nationalism ultimately succeeds in resolving the tension 
between the doctrines of liberalism and nationalism when it concerns the issue of 
immigration. This will be done by critical scrutiny of both the liberal nationalist line of 
reasoning and the arguments that have been put forward to disprove it. This exercise should 
eventually lead to an answer to the question whether the practice of privileging a national 
culture, identity or community in political decisions about immigration policies can be 
justified in a way that is consistent with liberal principles.  
 Before this can be established, a number of more specific sub-questions should be 
answered. To begin with, we should ask what exact arguments have been developed by the 
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liberal nationalist camp in its effort to justify restrictive immigration policies. Then, we have 
to examine the counterarguments built up in order to expose the liberal nationalist line of 
reasoning as internally inconsistent. Next, we are to compare both positions and critically 
reflect on them: given the persuasiveness of all arguments in the debate, to what extent can 
the liberal nationalist position on immigration be qualified as cogent and coherent? In the end, 
we will conclude that liberal nationalists manage to provide a convincing account of the 
importance of national identity for the fulfillment of some basic liberal ideals, but that 
immigration only impedes these vital functions of nationality under specific circumstances. 
Therefore, a state’s desire to protect the national identity does not justify a general policy of 
immigration restriction after all. 
 Both the research question and aim as formulated above indicate that the scope of this 
research is limited in a number of ways. To start with, only liberal nationalism will be 
investigated as a doctrine presenting a theoretical argument in favor of restrictive immigration 
policies. Philosophical doctrines that offer arguments leading to a similar conclusion but are 
not part of the liberal framework, such as communitarianism, are left out of the discussion. A 
similar approach is adopted towards the counterarguments in the debate. These will only be 
considered as far as they attack the liberal nationalist argument from a liberal perspective. 
Lastly, the discussion of liberal nationalist theory will not be general in character, but 
concentrate primarily on its merit and demerit when it concerns the question of immigration 
policies. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LIBERAL NATIONALIST POSITION 
 
If we want to establish the persuasiveness of the liberal nationalist argument in favor of 
limiting immigration, we should first of all have a closer look at the exact line of reasoning 
that it involves. In order to sketch the background against which the argument is developed, 
this chapter starts with an explanation of the core principle of liberal nationalist thought, as it 
was defined by Miller. Secondly, it is investigated how exactly the philosophies of liberalism 
and nationalism are combined in this view. We will see that the form of nationalism that 
Miller advocates requires liberal practices, and that his ideal of liberalism in turn calls for the 
protection of nationality. This will help us understand, thirdly, the two arguments that liberal 
nationalists employ in order to justify restrictive immigration policies. 
 
2.1 – Miller’s principle of nationality 
Although Miller was not the first political philosopher to use the term “liberal nationalism” 
(see for example Tamir, 1993) his On Nationality (1995) is generally seen as one of the 
groundworks of liberal nationalist theory. In this book, Miller spells out what he calls the 
“principle of nationality” (p. 19). This principle, which he believes to offer rational guidance 
when we are confronted with actual questions of nationality, consists of three interconnected 
propositions. 
 First of all, the fact that someone belongs to a certain national grouping may very well 
be a part of his identity (Miller, 1995, p. 10). It is important to note that national communities 
are constituted by belief: “nations exist when their members recognize one another as 
compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind” (p. 22). Media of 
mass communication play a crucial role in transmitting this belief to everyone who belongs. 
Therefore, nationality does not depend on anything concrete that exists in the real world: it is 
rather a mythical construct (pp. 32-33). It is not irrational, however, if someone makes his 
nationality a constitutive part of his personal identity. Miller explains: “[w]e always begin 
from values that have been incalculated in us by the communities and institutions to which we 
belong; family, school, church and so forth.” (p. 44) Throughout our lives, we work out who 
we are by constantly reflecting on these values and revising our identity – and “[t]here is no 
reason why nationality should be excluded from this process” (p. 45). 
 The second proposition makes clear why we should not think of nationality as a 
contingency that is irrelevant from a moral point of view: nations are, in fact, ethical 
communities (Miller, 1995, p. 11). This entails that individuals owe special obligations to 
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fellow members of their nation, which they do not owe to other human beings. Miller himself 
acknowledges that this proposition may be a contentious one, as it conflicts with the 
compelling conviction that every human being should matter equally to us. He then appeals to 
the idea of ethical particularism to clarify his position. On the ethical particularist view, 
“relations between persons are part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental 
principles may be attached directly to these relations” (p. 50). Someone who sees himself as a 
member of a certain group may thus justifiably express this identification by giving special 
weight to the interests of fellow-members. We already learned that Miller regards the nation 
as a group that an individual can rightly identify himself with. Therefore, the bonds of 
nationality can be seen to constitute one type of relations that is accompanied by special moral 
responsibilities from an ethical particularist perspective. As the specific content of these 
ethical demands is established through public debate within the national context, moral 
obligations between members of the national community may vary from nation to nation (pp. 
68-69). 
 The third and last component of the principle of nationality is constituted by the belief 
that people who form a national community in a particular territory have a good claim to 
political self-determination (Miller, 1995, p. 11). From the list of reasons that Miller provides 
in defense of this view, two stand out. The first concerns the importance of national culture. 
Since a nation’s culture is constitutive of the national identity that is incorporated in 
individuals’ perception of themselves, a national community should have the political means 
to protect its culture (pp. 85-86). The second reason concerns the demands of justice that 
accompany the bonds of nationality. The enforcement of these special moral obligations 
between co-nationals  requires a set of well-functioning state institutions (p. 83). Arguments 
related to these two contentions will be examined at greater length in the next section. Within 
the context of the principle of nationality, it suffices to say that they lead Miller to conclude 
that “each nation should have its own set of political institutions which allow it to decide 
collectively those matters that are the primary concern of its members” (p. 81). 
 
2.2 – Nationalism and liberalism combined 
We now have an idea of the core premises of the liberal nationalist doctrine. It is not yet clear, 
however, in what exact ways this theory integrates liberalism and nationalism into one 
coherent philosophy. A closer study of liberal nationalist literature reveals that the forms of 
liberalism and nationalism that are advocated by this doctrine stand in a mutually dependent 
9 
 
relationship to each other. As with all symbiotic associations, there are two sides to this 
liaison. 
 (A) Why nationalism calls for liberalism. Liberal nationalist philosophy distinguishes 
itself from conservative nationalism by letting go of the view that national identities are “cast 
in stone” (Miller, 1995, p. 127). The meaning of membership in a nation changes with time. 
This process of change should ideally consist in a collective conversation in which many 
voices may join. Crucially, “liberal freedoms play a vital role in providing the conditions 
under which the conversation can continue” (pp. 127-128). In this sense, liberal rights are 
valued as means whereby individuals can develop and express their ethnic and other group 
identities on the one hand, and take part in an ongoing collective debate about what it means 
to be a member of this nation on the other hand (p. 153). This is what makes Miller’s idea of 
nationality a liberal one.  
 The same goes for the concept of nationalism that was developed by Kymlicka 
(2001b). He points out a number of ways in which nation building can have a distinctively 
liberal character (pp. 258-259). First of all, states should use only a limited degree of coercion 
to promote a common national identity. Furthermore, forms of speech or political 
mobilization that challenge the privileging of a national identity ought not to be prohibited. In 
addition, membership in the nation should not be restricted: in principle it is open to anyone 
who wants to join. All of these elements demonstrate that the kind nationalism that Kymlicka 
promotes requires a liberal framework. 
 (B) Why liberalism calls for nationalism. The reasons that liberalism in turn may 
demand for nationalist principles are twofold. The first of these reasons regards the interests 
of the individual human being, who constitutes the ultimate unit of moral concern within 
liberal theory. Liberal nationalists contend that national identity is of such significant value to 
the individual person, that it should be protected. Some liberal philosophers insist that 
national identity is important because it provides individuals with a background against which 
they can make choices about how to live. This argument is developed most extensively by 
Kymlicka (2001a). “People make choices about the social practices around them, based on 
their beliefs about the value of these practices. And to have a belief about the value of a 
practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our 
culture.” (pp. 209-210) Therefore, meaningful individual choice is only possible if individuals 
have access to a national culture. National identity – or, more specifically, the national culture 
that is constitutive of this identity – thus equips the individual with a “context of choice” 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83) and can therefore be seen as essential to individual autonomy. A 
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similar argument is developed by Margalit & Raz (1990), who regard national culture as vital 
to individual well-being. “Individual well-being depends on the successful pursuit of 
worthwhile goals and relationships. Goals and relationships are culturally determined.” (p. 
448) Whether national identity is interpreted as the key to autonomy or well-being – either 
way individuals can be understood to have an important interest in the prosperity of their 
national culture. Protecting it by means of nationalist policies may thus be necessary. This 
line of reasoning could be summarized under the name of the “context of choice claim”. 
 Some liberal philosophers go one step further. Not only do they endorse the view that 
individuals have an interest in possessing a certain national identity that provides them with a 
context of choice, they also claim that individuals have an interest in “controlling the shape of 
cultural change in their country”; in “tying future generations to a cultural shape they valued” 
(Pevnick, 2008, pp. 110-111). Miller is one of these philosophers. According to him, national 
identity should not only be protected as a background against which individuals can make 
decisions, but also as “something that people have an interest in controlling: they want to be 
able to shape the way that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in the 
public culture” (Miller, 2005, p. 200). In this view, individuals may have good reason to try 
“to maintain cultural continuity over time, so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an 
identifiable cultural tradition that stretches backward historically” (ibid.). Let us call this 
supplementary argument the “control claim”. 
 A second reason why liberalism may require the protection of nationality, lies with the 
role that national identity can play by providing the conditions under which the institutions of 
the liberal state will succeed. A general point is made by Miller (1995): “[m]uch state activity 
involves the furthering of goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary co-operation 
of citizens. For this activity to be successful, the citizens must trust the state, and they must 
trust one another to comply with what the state demands of them.” (p. 91) Crucially, this 
social trust “requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn 
depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide” (p. 
140). On this view, it is national identity that enables individuals to cooperate as citizens 
(Miller, 2000, p. 88). 
 Kymlicka (2001b) makes clear that this applies specifically to cooperation in schemes 
that serve basic liberal egalitarian values (p. 265). Two institutions stand out in particular. The 
first is constituted by arrangements of social justice, for example in the form of the welfare 
state. Such arrangements require people to make sacrifices for the benefit of others whom 
they, in general, do not know personally. According to Kymlicka (2001a), we are only willing 
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to do so if we have the feeling that the sacrifices are being made for “one of us”, and – equally 
important – if we are trustful that others would do the same for us if circumstances were to 
change (p. 225). These feelings of solidarity and trust, in turn, are generated by the bonds of 
nationality. The second institution to which this line of reasoning applies is democracy. As 
with arrangements of social justice, a high level of trust is an essential precondition for 
democracy to succeed: “[p]eople must trust that others are genuinely willing to consider one’s 
interest and opinions” (p. 226). Furthermore, Kymlicka adds, “collective political deliberation 
is only feasible if participants understand one another, and this seems to require a common 
language” (ibid.). Again, the social trust and common language that are needed for realizing 
deliberative democracy can best be guaranteed if all participants share the same national 
background. Thus we have established the case for protection of national identity, a practice 
rooted in the principles of nationalism, by appealing to liberal values. 
 
2.3 – Liberal nationalism and immigration 
The interweaving of liberalism and nationalism in this way immediately presents us with 
considerations that are relevant with regard to the issue of immigration. What are the exact 
implications of the liberal nationalist line of reasoning when it concerns border policies? Two 
arguments stand out. 
 The first argument starts from the premise that the arrival of immigrants in the nation 
will change the public culture that is constitutive of the political identity of its original 
members (Miller, 2005, pp. 199-202). For one thing, newcomers tend to bring distinct cultural 
values with them. For another thing, the population growth that accompanies the flow of 
immigration will affect the range of possibilities regarding the way of living within the 
territory of the nation. As we saw above, the liberal nationalist is convinced that individuals 
have an important interest in the preservation of their culture – both because it molds the 
national identity that equips them with a context of choice (the context of choice claim), and 
because they want to control the development of their national culture (the control claim). 
This argument – which we can name the “individual interest argument” – thus presents us 
with a first reason why the liberal nationalist position is likely to imply the need for restrictive 
immigration policies. 
 The second argument is related, but slightly different. It begins with the observation 
that the newcomers who enter the state usually do not share the national identity of those 
already inhabiting it. To see why this is problematic, remember one of the findings in the 
previous section: the functioning of the fundamental liberal institutions of social justice and 
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democracy seems to be conditional upon the sharing of a national identity by all those that are 
part of these schemes. If the bonds of nationality between citizens living in the same state are 
lacking, the social trust, solidarity and common language that are indispensable to these 
institutions cannot be guaranteed. Admitting immigrants with a national identity different 
from that of the people already residing in the state, may therefore lead to a situation in which 
some citizens – either from the group of immigrants or the original national community – do 
not feel able or willing to contribute to the schemes of social justice and democracy. This puts 
these institutions into great danger, as Miller (2000) explains: “[a]nyone who is unable or 
unwilling to [contribute] is free-riding on those who comply, and no social practice based on 
reciprocity will survive once free-riding exceeds a certain minimum point” (p. 89). In order to 
prevent the collapse of the institutions that are valued so highly from a liberal point of view, 
states may choose not to give citizenship rights freely to all those that arrive at their borders. 
We call this the “liberal institutions argument”.  
 Clearly, these two arguments point to the conclusion that states have good reasons for 
restricting immigration. Indeed, the arguments lead liberal nationalists to conclude that 
nation-states are justified in limiting immigration in an attempt to protect the national identity 
(Miller, 2005, p. 193). It is not entirely clear, however, what exact restrictive immigration 
policies the liberal nationalist would prescribe. Interestingly, Miller’s standpoint seems to 
have toughened throughout the years. In On Nationality (1995) he states that “immigration 
need not pose problems, provided only that the immigrants come to share a common national 
identity, to which they may contribute their own distinctive ingredients” (p. 26). In his later 
essay (2000) he declares that “citizenship is, and has been seen to be, a valuable status, and 
states therefore naturally wish to restrict its possession to those who identify themselves with 
the nation and are carriers of the right cultural identity” (pp. 88-89). An even sharper 
statement dates from his more recent paper (2005): “nation-states have a strong and legitimate 
interest in determining who comes in and who does not” (p. 202). For now, we will conclude 
that liberal nationalist theory generally entails the position that a state may legitimately 
restrict the number of immigrants who cross its borders in order to protect the national 
identity. 
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CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGING THE LIBERAL NATIONALIST POSITION 
 
Now we have investigated the liberal nationalist plea for restrictive immigration policies, it is 
time to turn to the criticisms that this line of reasoning has faced. The critique has centered 
around the two basic arguments that were outlined above: the individual interest argument on 
the one hand and the liberal institutions argument on the other. Therefore, this chapter will 
deal with each of these categories of criticism respectively. We will see that Pevnick and 
Abizadeh challenge the logic of both arguments in various ways, thereby trying to 
demonstrate that the liberal nationalist line of reasoning ultimately fails to provide a 
justification for immigration restriction that is consistent with liberal principles. 
 
3.1 – Challenging the individual interest argument  
The first defense of restrictive immigration policies that we saw in the previous chapter, starts 
from the premise that immigration may change a nation’s distinctive culture. According to the 
liberal nationalist, this is an unacceptable prospect: firstly because culture is constitutive of 
the national identity that provides the individual human being with a context of choice (the 
context of choice claim), and secondly because people have an important interest in 
controlling the way in which their national culture develops (the control claim). Hence, the 
individual’s interest in preserving and controlling the shape of his national identity gives us a 
reason why a state may justifiably limit immigration. What objections does this line of 
reasoning face?  
 To begin with, Pevnick (2008) addresses the context of choice claim by arguing that a 
national identity need not be entirely constant in order to supply the individual with a context 
of choice that warrants his autonomy and well-being. “Even if individuals have a claim to a 
cultural context that follows from a commitment to autonomy, it does not follow that they 
have a claim to a certain cultural context. If nationality gains its significance by making 
autonomous life possible, individuals have a strong interest in a context that they can make 
sense of, a context that can fulfill this role, but this does not show that changes to the cultural 
context (so long as they are manageably gradual) are an important affront to the autonomy of 
individuals within it.” (p. 102) In other words: the evolution of culture will not put the 
autonomy or well-being of the individual into trouble – in fact, it might even broaden his 
autonomy – as long as he can digest these changes by recognizing and embracing them as 
new parts of his context of choice. This process of adaption does require that cultural change, 
for example as a result of immigration, not be “dislocatingly abrupt” (ibid.). It does not 
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follow, however, that immigration may be limited in order to prevent any form of cultural 
change.  
 Yet, the control claim could serve as a counterargument to Pevnick’s criticism. We 
learned that Miller (2005) is convinced that “the public culture of their country is something 
that individuals have an interest in controlling” (p. 200). If this is true, we can see why indeed 
even the slightest change of culture harms the interests of the individuals within the nation, in 
the case that such a variation emanates from forces or actors external to the national 
community. In this sense, the control claim seems to be a necessary supplement to the context 
of choice claim, if the goal is to demonstrate that immigration should be restricted.  
 Pevnick (2008) recognizes this potential objection, but protests that “it does not follow 
that the interest citizens of destination countries have in a reasonably stable cultural context 
overrides the interests or claims of potential immigrants” (p. 105). In fact, “[i]t seems unlikely 
that claims based on cultural context will ever outweigh minimally reasonable requests for 
asylum” (ibid.). Why does Pevnick bestow such little moral significance on the interest that 
people have in their ability to shape the way their nation develops? He tries to clarify the 
matter by sketching the historical example of the American quota system, which was 
introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century and restricted immigration by admitting 
only a certain number of newcomers per category of national origin (pp. 111-113). The policy 
was designed to ensure the future survival of America’s distinctive cultural identity. However, 
after the system had been abolished in the second half of the twentieth century, it was widely 
acknowledged that it had been “a policy of deliberate discrimination” that was “inconsistent 
with our beliefs in the rights of man” (quoted in Daniels, 2004, p. 129). This example shows 
that “it is a mistake to put much weight on the desire people have (real enough, though it may 
be) to see the future survival or success of their cultural way of life” (Pevnick, 2008, p. 111).  
 The claims of potential immigrants, on the other hand, tend to be much more 
powerful. According to Pevnick (2008), “[p]otential immigrants often have strong reasons 
based in distributive justice for requesting entry and it is hard to see why one’s interest in the 
future survival of their culture should outweigh such reasons” (p. 115). The liberal value of 
equality requires us to take seriously both the interests of the members of a nation who wish 
to control cultural change, and the interests of potential immigrants who desire to lead 
meaningful lives. Given the unequal distribution of available options for leading meaningful 
lives across the globe, it is difficult to imagine how the former interests could ever outweigh 
the latter in decisions about immigration policies – such is the point that Pevnick tries to 
make. 
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 Again, Miller disagrees. He builds on his idea of ethical particularism by arguing that 
the moral obligations of distributive justice between compatriots carry considerably more 
weight than those between inhabitants of different nations (Miller, 2005, p. 198). Nonetheless, 
Miller does recognize that affluent states cannot simply shut their borders and do nothing if 
living standards in other countries fall below a certain minimal threshold. However, he 
suggests that states may best contribute to the relief of global poverty by “improving 
conditions of life on the ground, as it were, rather than bypassing the problem by allowing 
(inevitably selective) inward migration” (p. 199). 
 
3.2 – Challenging the liberal institutions argument 
The second argument in favor of restrictive immigration policies begins from the observation 
that potential immigrants usually do not possess the same national identity as the community 
of people that inhabit the destination country. If these newcomers become part of the state, 
their membership will undermine the feelings of solidarity, trust and understanding that are 
conditional upon the functioning of the liberal institutions of democracy and social justice. 
Therefore, membership in the state must be restricted to those who carry the relevant national 
identity – and those who do not possess it should not be let in. How has this second line of 
reasoning been criticized? 
 Two important counterarguments are related to a principle formulated by Abizadeh 
(2006). “An associative duty or liberty to close borders would exist only if (1) the fulfilment 
of genuine special responsibilities somehow requires closed borders and (2) the requirement 
to fulfill those special responsibilities through closed borders is not overridden by closure’s 
impact on general responsibilities to outsiders.” (p. 7) Let us start by considering the first of 
these conditions. It checks an empirical claim: the special responsibilities between members 
of the same nation can only be fulfilled if borders are closed. By “special responsibilities”, we 
understand the duties that are generally realized through the institutions of democracy and 
social justice. If these institutions can just as well function when borders are open, we have no 
reason to close them – such is Abizadeh’s idea.  
 In fact, the claim that the functioning of the institutions of the liberal state depends on 
the existence of a shared national identity, has been widely challenged from an empirical 
point of view. This applies to the institutions of both democracy and social justice. With 
regard to the former, Abizadeh (2006) states: “liberal democracy and social integration are not 
dependent on the existence of a single national public culture in any thick sense” (p. 3). 
Specifically, he challenges Kymlicka’s idea that a shared national background and common 
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language are necessary for the trust and understanding that make democracy possible. In the 
first place, Abizadeh (2002) denies that the social trust that is necessary for a well-functioning 
democracy requires a common national culture. He explains: “I would wager that, given the 
choice, informed Iranian journalists accused of some crime would ‘trust’ a German judge to 
grant them a fair trial far more than they would trust an Iranian judge, with whom they 
presumably share a common culture” (p. 501). In the second place, he challenges the view 
that a common language is quintessential for meaningful public discussion. “Democratic 
deliberation at a societal level is often mediated via the media, and multilingual media 
personnel can and do serve to bridge the communicational gaps at the societal level between 
individuals who do not speak the same language.” (p. 503)  
 With regard to system of social welfare, it is again Pevnick (2007) who challenges the 
empirical claim that the institution can only function appropriately when borders are closed. 
His arguments are twofold. The first one follows Abizadeh in denying the necessity of a 
shared national identity as a basis for the institutions of the liberal state altogether. These 
institutions can generate their own support, it is claimed: “[a]gainst the view that diversity 
necessarily undermines the provision of public goods, many analysts argue that the trust on 
which the welfare state relies depends more on the shape of the institutions than on the 
identity of the population that they serve” (p. 3). Thus if welfare programs manage to 
incorporate immigrants in a way that current citizens see as fair, they will maintain their 
support. Pevnick’s second argument, on the other hand, starts from the supposition that a 
shared national identity is indeed necessary as a foundation for the institutions of the liberal 
state. However, such an identity does not constitute a pre-political given beyond human 
control: “scholars of nationality regularly argue that identification with such communities is 
socially constructed; it is (at least partly) the result of institutionally created shared 
experiences, stories and myths” (p. 4.). If a shared identity can be engineered through a public 
mythology, states could therefore just as well refrain from restrictive immigration policies, 
and focus instead on the construction and communication of a public mythology that is to 
convince the masses that the newcomers belong to the nation too. Both these two arguments – 
henceforth: the “institutional view” and “social construct view” respectively – suggest that 
Abizadeh’s first condition is not met: the fulfilment of special responsibilities between co-
nationals does not require closed borders. 
 The second of Abizadeh’s conditions involves a normative question: does the moral 
requirement to fulfill special responsibilities between insiders by closing borders override 
closure’s impact on general responsibilities to outsiders? Now leave aside the empirical 
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objections of the institutional view and the social construct view expressed above. In other 
words, suppose that members of the same nation could only fulfil the special responsibilities 
that they owe to each other by blocking the entry of immigrants. Does this provide us with a 
justification to close the state’s borders? Pevnick (2007) thinks it does not. Rather than a 
moral justification, it gives a pragmatic reason for this decision – one that “masks an 
undefended normative assumption” (p. 6).  
 What does this normative assumption boil down to? Pevnick (2007) explains: “Even if 
increased immigration and the crumbling of the welfare state would have bad consequences 
for current citizens, it is likely that the overall consequences of such a scenario (including and 
weighing equally the needs and interests of foreigners) would be better than the overall 
consequences of the status quo (because those from poor countries have a tremendous amount 
to gain by accessing productive economies). In the absence of an explanation for why we 
should prioritize the needs and interests of compatriots, the appeal to consequences is 
therefore erroneous.” (p. 6) Abizadeh (2006) shares Pevnick’s position: “given current levels 
of [global] inequality, such a justification of borders, grounded in special responsibilities and 
capable of overcoming the distributive objection, is not forthcoming” (p. 8). 
 This line of reasoning is similar to the objection against the control claim that was 
described in the previous section: the interests of citizens currently inhabiting a state can 
never constitute a justification for limiting immigration in their own right: they have to be 
weighed against the interests of potential immigrants. As we already saw, Miller could rebut 
this argument by referring to the moral demands of his form of ethical particularism. 
Nonetheless, Abizadeh and Pevnick draw the attention to an important concern regarding the 
liberal nationalist position: limiting immigration cannot be justified by merely pointing to the 
consequences for those within the boundaries of the state – the interests of those outside 
should be taken into account as well.   
 One last objection against the liberal institutions argument remains. Suppose that we 
accept both the empirical claim that the institutions of the liberal state require the existence of 
a common nationality, and the normative idea that the interests of insiders override those of 
outsiders. Even if this argument is successful, so Pevnick (2007) contends, it only provides 
reason to prevent immigrants from joining the community that these institutions apply to – it 
does not provide reason to prevent immigrants from entering the state’s territory (pp. 11-12). 
According to Pevnick, liberal nationalists wrongly depict citizenship in the destination 
country as an “all or nothing bundle” (p. 10). In fact, the privileges and burdens of citizenship 
can be disaggregated into “claims of residence” and “claims of membership”. Whereas claims 
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of residence only include the most basic entitlements such as the right to live and to work in a 
certain territory, claims of membership also comprise privileges such as the right to vote and 
to receive social insurance benefits.  
 Distinguishing between these two forms of citizenship enables us to find a potential 
solution to the putative incompatibility of unrestricted immigration and well-functioning 
institutions in the liberal state. This solution is constituted by the possibility to grant 
immigrants claims of residence, thereby allowing them to enter the state – without granting 
them claims of membership, thereby preserving the closed community of citizens who partake 
in the institutions of democracy and social justice (Pevnick, 2007, p. 12). Liberal nationalists 
tend to ignore this possibility, even though many migrants in fact seek for residence instead of 
membership in the state. The reluctance to allow for different kinds of citizenship is clearly 
present in Miller’s (2000) plea for a republican conception of citizenship, in which the various 
privileges and burdens of membership in the state are presented as one integral package (pp. 
82-89). According to Pevnick (2007), liberal nationalists thus present us with a false choice 
between restricting immigration and preserving our democracy and welfare state on the one 
hand, and allowing for unlimited immigration and abandoning these institutions on the other. 
This leads him to conclude that the liberal institutions argument in favor of immigration 
restrictions, like the individual interest argument, does not hold.  
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CHAPTER 4: FINAL EVALUATION 
The previous chapters have provided an extensive overview of the most important arguments 
that have been put forward in the debate about the liberal nationalist position on immigration. 
This chapter starts by briefly summarizing these arguments. This will enable us, as a next 
step, to weigh all of the considerations against each other in an attempt to develop a final 
judgment on the force of the liberal nationalist line of reasoning. This exercise will be 
structured along the same lines as the discussion above: first we will evaluate the individual 
interest argument and the objections it faces; then the liberal institutions argument and the 
protests against it. The chapter will be concluded by an eventual verdict on the crucial 
question: does liberal nationalism ultimately succeed in showing that a state may be justified 
in privileging a national culture, identity or community in political decisions about 
immigration policies in a way that is consistent with liberal principles? 
 
4.1 – Summarizing the arguments 
Before we proceed to the evaluation of the positions that we encountered, let us briefly look 
back at our traces. Chapter 2 started out with an explanation of the basic principle of liberal 
nationalism. Then, two distinct arguments in favor of restricting immigration were abstracted 
from it. According to the individual interest argument, limiting immigration is necessary in 
order to protect the national culture, since it is crucial to the autonomy and well-being of the 
individual (the context of choice claim), and since individuals have an interest in shaping the 
cultural development of their nation (the control claim). According to the liberal institutions 
argument, immigration restrictions are needed since freely allowing any potential immigrant 
to enter would undermine the social trust, solidarity and understanding, generated by ties of 
nationality, that make democracy and social justice possible.  
 In chapter 3, we saw that both of these arguments face a number of objections. Against 
the individual interest argument, it was first of all asserted that national identities need not be 
entirely constant in order to provide individuals with a context of choice. Secondly, it was 
disputed that the interest that individuals might have in controlling cultural change within 
their nation would ever outweigh the interests of potential immigrants. Against the liberal 
institutions argument, it was first of all claimed that a national identity may not even be 
necessary as a foundation for democracy and social justice: these institutions could generate 
their own support (the institutional view). Secondly, it was argued that, even if we accepted 
the necessity of national identity, such an identity could be actively created by means of a 
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public mythology (the social construct view). Thirdly, the liberal institutions argument was 
also faced with the objection that the insiders’ interests regarding democracy and social 
justice are likely to be outweighed by the claims of outsiders. Fourthly and lastly, we were 
presented with the option of distinguishing between citizens partaking in the institutions of the 
liberal state, and resident-aliens who may only live and work within its boundaries. With 
these arguments fresh in our memories, we can now turn to the evaluation of the positions 
within the debate. 
 
4.2 – The individual interest argument: the weakness of the control claim 
Liberal nationalism’s context of choice claim, establishing the importance of national identity 
to the autonomy and well-being of individuals, is a powerful one. We could follow Raz 
(1986) in understanding autonomy as the capacity to make choices about how to live from a 
range of meaningful options. Well-being, in turn, results from the successful pursuit of those 
life purposes that someone chooses for himself (pp. 369-372). Making sense of the range of 
options that is available and deciding which goals to strive for in life, requires the ability to 
attach meaning to these options and to assess their value. Crucially, an individual can only 
make such judgments about the meaning and value of different options within a framework of 
language and culture that is determined by his national background. Whether to marry or not, 
which occupation to pursue, what color to paint our house – we can only make such decisions 
within the frame of reference that we developed within our specific national context. 
Therefore it seems that liberal nationalists are right to observe that individuals have an 
important interest in the preservation of their national identity, or the distinctive culture that is 
constitutive of it. 
 However, there are strong reasons to assume that someone’s national identity may 
very well evolve over time, while still serving the vital function of providing him with a 
context of choice. To see why this is true, think of the continuous process of experience that 
shapes each person’s frame of reference throughout his life. As an individual grows older, he 
is confronted with an ever increasing number of words from his national language and aspects 
of his national culture. Each time he encounters such a new element, his context of choice is 
slightly altered. A twelve-year-old may choose to paint his room red because it is his favorite 
color; the same person may at a later age decide not to paint the front of his house red as he 
has come to be aware that this color is generally associated with the Communist movement in 
his country, which he is not affiliated with. Is it a bad thing if someone’s context of choice 
changes as he comes across new aspects of language and culture? Presumably, it is not. As 
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long as he can still employ his national background as a frame of reference for making 
meaningful choices, it is hard to see how slight adjustments of its content would hamper his 
autonomy or well-being. Nonetheless, it takes time to incorporate newly discovered elements 
into one’s framework of choice: one has to recognize these elements, make sense of them, 
accept them as new points of reference and practice in using them as such. But if individuals 
are allowed the time to go through this process, there is no reason to assume that their 
autonomy or well-being is hindered as their national identity evolves with time. 
 If this is true for the individual who encounters new aspects of his nationality as he 
grows older, it might as well be true for the person that is faced with unfamiliar elements 
within his nation as these are introduced by newcomers. Provided that the original inhabitants 
are not faced with too many different novelties within too short a period of time, they could 
reasonably be expected to incorporate these new elements into their context of choice without 
experiencing damage to their autonomy or well-being. All in all, Pevnick’s (2008) conclusion 
regarding the context of choice claim turns out to be right: “[a] slowly evolving culture or a 
culture different in important ways from some traditional ideal is capable of providing the 
necessary cultural context and consistent with individuals being at home within it” (p. 103). 
 This notion of national identity as ever transforming, rather than set in stone, seems to 
be in accord with the liberal nationalist view of nationality in its initial formulation. In On 
Nationality (1995), Miller stresses that national identities are “above all ‘imagined’ identities, 
where the content of the imagining changes with time” (p. 127). Ideally, this process of 
change “should consist in a collective conversation in which many voices can join. No voice 
has a privileged status: those who seek to defend traditional interpretations enter the 
conversation on an equal footing with those who want to propose changes.” (ibid.) On a 
similar note, Kymlicka (2001b) points out that “in a liberal nation, the societal culture is an 
open and pluralistic one, which borrows whatever it finds worthwhile in other cultures, 
integrates it into its own practices, and passes it on to subsequent generations” (p. 260). If 
these quotations accurately capture the essence of the liberal nationalist view of national 
identity, then how could immigration possibly be regarded as problematic in character? 
 This is where the control claim comes in. In his essay Immigration: The Case for 
Limits (2005) Miller states that “the public culture of their country is something that people 
have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape the way that their nation 
develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture” (p. 200). Specifically, 
he argues that people may have good reasons to “try to maintain cultural continuity over time, 
so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an identifiable cultural tradition that stretches 
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backward historically” (ibid.). From this perspective, closed borders do not seem so 
unreasonable after all. 
 However, this line of reasoning appears to be inconsistent with the liberal nationalist 
notion of national identity. This becomes clear if we ask the question: what does it mean for 
someone to control the way in which his national identity develops? A first possibility is that 
the control claim constitutes a statement about the group of people that should have the power 
to determine how the national identity will evolve. In this sense, an individual could be 
understood as having control over the cultural change within his nation, if public deliberation 
about the matter is restricted to those who are already member of the nation. Should we thus 
interpret Miller’s (1995) idea of “a collective conversation in which many voices can join” (p. 
127) as one in which actually only those who have always been part of the nation are heard? I 
believe the answer is no. To see why, consider the next passage from On Nationality: “[a]ll 
[nationality] needs to ask of immigrants is a willingness to accept current political structures 
and to engage in dialogue with the host community so that a new common identity can be 
forged” (pp. 129-130). Apparently, immigrants are indeed qualified as participants in the 
debate.  
 Then what does the control claim establish? A second possibility is that it is a 
substantive claim regarding the nature of cultural change. Whoever may join the collective 
conversation regarding the development of the national culture, the right to cultural continuity 
of the original members of the national community should always be reflected in the outcome. 
However, this interpretation is at odds with Miller’s (1995) view that “those who seek to 
defend traditional interpretations enter the conversation on an equal footing with those who 
want to propose changes” (p. 127.) Thus, both readings of Miller’s control claim run counter 
to previous statements that he has made. 
 Underlying the control claim seems to be the thought that the individual has an interest 
in not having to adapt himself to a change in the national identity that has been brought about 
by the newcomers to his nation. It is important to see that Miller does not regard the necessity 
to adapt in general as harmful to the interest of the individual. After all, we learned that 
national identities are always subject to a process of change that is steered by a public debate 
on the question what it means to be part of the nation. We can assume that this public 
dialogue will always be characterized by a variety of opinions. This is true even if all those 
who join in the conversation were born within the nation-state’s boundaries. Therefore, no 
individual can ever reasonably expect that the process of cultural change exactly matches his 
particular wishes. However, Miller only seems to find it problematic if an individual has to 
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adjust to some cultural change that does not entirely conform to his desires, if the necessity to 
adapt results from the input of outsiders to the nation. What he fails to do, is to provide a 
reason why it is not problematic if someone has to adjust to a certain development that results 
from the contributions of his fellow nationals to the public debate, whereas it does harm his 
interest if he has to adapt to some change that is introduced by newcomers to the nation.  
 Interestingly, Miller (2005) appears to be aware of this ambivalence in his own theory 
when he states that “the most valuable cultures are those that can develop and adapt to new 
circumstances, including the presence of new subcultures associated with immigrants” (p. 
200). Nonetheless, he holds onto his position that the interest of individuals in controlling the 
way that their national culture develops can justify the restriction of immigration. All in all, 
we can conclude that he does not manage to ground this control claim on a line of reasoning 
that is both convincing and coherent. On the other hand, we saw that the context of choice 
claim is indeed backed by a persuasive line of argument. This observation is important for our 
conclusions regarding the liberal nationalist position on immigration. 
 Suppose that we accept the hypothesis that immigration is likely to change a nation’s 
culture – as I think we should. The context of choice claim presents us with a strong reason to 
limit immigration from the point that it starts to transcend the capacity of individuals to 
incorporate the cultural elements that are introduced by newcomers into their context of 
choice. But the control claim does not succeed in giving us a reason for restricting 
immigration in general, in an effort to give individuals the power to control the development 
of “their” national identity. In fact, we can agree with Miller’s position as it was formulated in 
On Nationality (1995): “this points, however, not towards preventing immigration, but to 
limiting its rate according to the absorptive capacities of the society in question” (p. 129). But 
we should reject the conclusion of his later Immigration: The Case for Limits (2005): “a 
political judgment needs to be made about the scale and type of immigration that will enrich 
rather than dislocate the existing public culture” (p. 201).  
 
4.3 – The liberal institutions argument: the power of the social construct view 
Liberal nationalists do not only succeed in giving a convincing account of the importance of 
national identity for the autonomy and well-being of the individual, they also construct a 
powerful logic regarding the use of national identity for the institutions of social justice and 
democracy. Generally, such institutions apply to large numbers of individuals who, for the 
most part, do not know each other personally. It seems unlikely that these individuals would 
be willing to make sacrifices for one another; trustful that such favors would be returned; 
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understanding of one another’s interests and concerns; and confident that others would take 
theirs into account – if the state institutions claiming their allegiance were the only things 
connecting them. Indeed, it seems plausible that the bonds of nationality, which give people 
the idea that they belong to the same group, account for the feelings of mutual solidarity, trust 
and understanding that permit individuals to cooperate in systems of social justice and 
democracy.   
 In the previous chapter, we learned that the empirical accuracy of this part of the 
liberal institutions argument has been attacked by the institutional view. From this 
perspective, the functioning of the institutions of democracy and social justice is in no sense 
dependent upon the existence of a shared nationality. If these institutions are just, they 
generate their own support – so it is argued. Some, though not all, empirical studies confirm 
this thesis (Pevnick, 2007, p. 3). Nonetheless, the institutional view does not seem to be a 
forceful challenge of the liberal institutions argument. This becomes clear if we look at the 
example of the European Union.  
 Let us start from the observation that the EU moved both the institutions of democracy 
and social justice, in some form, to a supranational level. After all, the citizens of member 
states now get to vote for the European Parliament and, as a result of the EU’s budgetary 
politics, experience the consequences of a certain degree of redistribution of resources 
between these states (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011). However, this way of realizing democracy 
and some degree of social justice at the European level has not been an easy undertaking. 
After the rise of several anti-EU parties in various countries throughout the Union, the British 
call for a referendum regarding a so-called “Brexit”, and the recent Dutch popular vote 
against the Association Treaty between the EU and Ukraine, it has become difficult to deny 
that the European integration encounters substantial opposition from large parts of the 
European population.  
 If we assume that the institutions of the EU are just, then the gap in public support for 
the European schemes of democracy and social justice presents the institutional view with an 
inexplicable case: apparently, just institutions do not always generate their own support. From 
a liberal nationalist point of view, the current resistance against European integration is hardly 
surprising. The EU lacks a common national identity that makes British citizens willing to 
make sacrifices for Romanians; that makes the Dutch trustful that their favor as one of the 
biggest net contributors will ever be returned; that makes the Greek confident that their 
interests are taken into account by the other European voters; and that makes democratic 
deliberation in a single language that everyone understands possible. The example of the EU 
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thus suggests that we should recognize the importance of national identity as a basis for the 
functioning of liberal institutions, and that the institutional view should be rejected. 
 However, this does not mean that we should also accept the next step in the liberal 
institutions argument, stating that the role of national identity in laying the foundation for the 
institutions of the liberal state justifies closed border policies. Remember that this inference 
was challenged by the social construct view. On this account, it is indeed assumed that only a 
national identity can provide people with the feelings of mutual trust, understanding and 
solidarity, upon which the institutions of the liberal state can build. Yet, it stresses that a 
national identity can in fact be modified in a way that it includes newcomers to the nation as 
well. How convincing is this line of argument?   
 At the beginning of this research, we learned that national identities are not “given” or 
“fixed”, but are constituted by feelings of belonging that are fostered through means of mass 
communication. Miller (1995) emphasizes that “[w]hat holds nations together are beliefs (…), 
but these beliefs cannot be transmitted except through cultural artefacts which are available to 
everyone who belongs – books, newspapers, pamphlets, and more recently the electronic 
media.” (p. 32) If this is true, then Pevnick (2007) has a good point in asking: if a shared 
national identity is an empirical prerequisite for systems of democracy and social justice, why 
not create the communities of shared identity needed to maintain them? (p. 4) Here we 
witness the birth of the social construct view. If we follow Miller’s understanding of national 
identity, we can indeed imagine that media of mass communication are employed in order to 
spread a newly constructed public mythology of which newcomers are part as well, thus 
including them in the national community to which the institutions of democracy and social 
justice apply. Hence, we must conclude that the social construct view in fact presents us with 
a suitable alternative to restricting immigration in order to protect the institutions of the liberal 
state. 
 Still, it has to be acknowledged that such a change in national identity should not be 
too radical or too abrupt. For one thing, a national identity cannot be engineered out of thin 
air. History shows that national identities may partly be the product of the elites’ efforts to 
unite the inhabitants of their territory behind a common cause, but they are also rooted in pre-
existing ethnic identities and shaped by historical figures, deeds and incidents (Miller, 2000, 
pp. 87-88). An identity that is invented in order to include newcomers in the national 
community, but does not stretch backward historically in any sense, is therefore unlikely to 
succeed. The newly constructed national identity should rather build on the foundations of the 
earlier notion of nationality, while at the same time either incorporating the foreign cultural 
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elements that were introduced by newcomers, or embracing the acceptance of immigrants as 
an act of national virtue. For another thing, a change of national identity should always be 
gradual for reasons that were explained in the previous section. In order to enable the original 
members of the nation to get used to the new elements within their national culture and to 
accept them as parts of their context of choice, a national identity cannot be transformed too 
quickly. As long as these two requirements are met, the creation of a national identity of 
which newcomers are part constitutes a promising alternative to restricting immigration in an 
attempt to preserve the institutions of democracy and social justice. 
 To come back to the example of the EU once more, we could use the insights of the 
social construct view in order to develop a solution to the problem concerning public support 
for the European institutions as well. The social construct view suggests that the creation of a 
unified European identity may provide the EU citizens with a basis of trust, understanding and 
solidarity upon which the common institutions can then build. In fact, this is what Pevnick 
(2007) proposes with regard to the erection of European institutions of social justice: “EU 
leaders may gradually instill a common European identity in members that will eventually 
support redistribution across member states” (p. 5). Still, the considerations mentioned above 
indicate that the engineering of such a European identity should not be done in a precipitous 
or reckless manner. 
 So far, we can conclude that liberal nationalism presents us with valuable insights 
regarding the significance of national identity to the autonomy and well-being of the 
individual and to the functioning of the fundamental institutions of the liberal state – but that 
its inferences about immigration, at least in some formulations, have not been entirely valid. 
However, we have not yet evaluated all of the counterarguments that Pevnick and Abizadeh 
put forward.  
 First, remember Pevnick’s (2007) idea of distinguishing between citizens who enjoy 
full membership in the state, and resident-aliens who may only live and work in it. At first 
sight, this suggestion seems to weaken the liberal institutions argument, as it presents us with 
a possibility of maintaining the institutions of democracy and social justice while at the same 
time admitting immigrants to enter the state. However, the proposal can be easily rejected if 
we appeal to the individual interest argument. The individual interest argument points out that 
the presence of large numbers of newcomers tends to impact upon a nation’s culture, because 
of both the population growth that accompanies immigration and the arrival of new cultural 
elements that immigrants bring with them. This change of the national culture will occur 
regardless of the status of the newcomers as either full citizens or resident-aliens. Therefore, 
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we still have reason to restrict immigration if it exceeds the point where individuals can no 
longer adapt their context of choice to these cultural changes without experiencing a decline 
of their autonomy or well-being. 
 Second, we saw that both Pevnick (2007) and Abizadeh (2006) try to refute the two 
liberal nationalist arguments in favor of immigration restriction by pointing out that the 
interests of citizens living in the destination country are normally outweighed by the interests 
of potential immigrants. However, this probably constitutes one of the less forceful ways to 
attack the liberal nationalist standpoint. After all, liberal nationalists explicitly endorse a 
particularist view of ethics, according to which individuals have special obligations towards 
their fellow nationals that they do not owe towards people in general. Liberal nationalists can 
thus justify the “unequal” weighing of the interests of outsiders and insiders respectively.  
 Still, liberal nationalists tend to acknowledge that the interests of potential immigrants 
should be taken seriously as well. For Miller (1995) this means that states have a prima facie 
obligation to admit refugees, defined as “people who are being deprived of rights to 
subsistence, basic healthcare, etc.” (p. 202). However, he notes later on, “states have to be 
given considerable autonomy to decide on how to respond to particular asylum applications” 
(p. 203). Although this position logically follows from the liberal nationalists concerns 
regarding the preservation of national identity, this chapter has given us good reasons to 
believe that the autonomy of states to decide on such matters should not be so “considerable” 
in the end. After all, we established that states only have reasons for restricting immigration if 
such policies are needed in order to prevent too abrupt or too radical a change of national 
identity. 
 
4.4 – The liberal nationalist position: legitimate concerns, invalid inferences 
What final verdict on the liberal nationalist position on immigration can we now reach? First 
of all, it has become clear that liberal nationalists address some important issues that should 
not be overlooked in considering matters of immigration. National identities do play a 
significant role in providing individuals with a background against which they make life 
choices, and in securing the dispositions of solidarity, trust and understanding that make 
people participate in systems of democracy and social justice. However, we have also seen 
that it is possible for states to sustain these valuable functions of national identity while 
allowing immigrants to cross their borders.  
 There are two situations in which states may justifiably restrict immigration. The first 
occurs if the arrival of immigrants, bringing with them distinct cultural elements, exceeds the 
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capacity of current citizens to digest slight changes of culture by adapting their context of 
choice. In this case, the individual interest argument provides a good reason for limiting the 
amount of newcomers to the nation. The second situation arises when it is no longer possible 
for the state to construct and communicate a new national identity of which the immigrants 
are part, that builds on the earlier national identity in a credible way, and that does not 
demand too rapid an accommodation by the individuals belonging to the nation. In this case, 
the liberal institutions argument serves as a ground for restricting immigration. 
 All in all, liberal nationalism’s concerns respecting national identity are legitimate, but 
its inferences regarding immigration policies are not all equally valid. Specifically, we should 
reject the view that considerations regarding the preservation of national identity justify states 
in general to decide for themselves whether to accept immigrants or not. After all, we saw 
that the individual interest and liberal institutions argument only provide reason to limit 
immigration under specific circumstances that do not apply generally. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Our journey started out with the question whether the practice of privileging a national 
culture, identity or community in political decisions about immigration policies can be 
justified in a way that is consistent with liberal principles. An affirmative answer to this 
question can be found in the theory of liberal nationalism. The arguments are twofold and rely 
on the importance of national identity for the fulfillment of the fundamental ideals of 
liberalism. Firstly, it is in the interest of the individual to have a national identity that equips 
him with a background against which meaningful choices can be made, and to be in control of 
the development of this national identity. Secondly, the liberal institutions of democracy and 
social justice depend on feelings of solidarity, trust and understanding that can only be 
generated by the bonds of nationality. As the arrival of newcomers with different cultural 
values tends to endanger the national identity of those inhabiting the destination country – so 
the liberal nationalist argues – the state is justified in limiting immigration. This last 
conclusion, however, turns out to be too quick.  
 Two particular considerations regarding the nature of national identities are of special 
importance in this regard. In the first place, national identities need not be entirely constant in 
order to provide individuals with a context of choice. Indeed, individuals are perfectly capable 
of accepting slight changes of their national identity without experiencing a decline in 
autonomy or well-being, even in the case that these are brought about by the arrival of 
newcomers to the nation. In the second place, national communities are constituted by a sense 
of belonging on the part of their members. Crucially, such feelings can be generated by the 
construction of a public mythology that credibly defines the national identity and is carefully 
communicated to the masses. 
 If we take these aspects of national identity into account, we can see that a general 
restriction of immigration is often not necessary. First, a flow of immigration need not 
damage the autonomy and well-being of the citizens inhabiting the destination country, as 
long as they have the time to adapt to the cultural change that accompanies the arrival of 
newcomers in the nation. Second, the institutions of democracy and social justice can be 
sustained and extended to include the group of immigrants, if a new national identity of which 
the newcomers are part is prudently constructed and transmitted to all members of the nation. 
Only if admitting immigrants is not possible without an overly abrupt transformation of 
people’s contexts of choice, or without resorting to an excessively farfetched public 
mythology, restrictive immigration policies can be justified. 
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 Naturally, much more can be said on the issue of closed borders within liberal theory. 
This research has demonstrated for what reasons and in what ways considerations about 
national identity should be taken into account in the setup of a state’s immigration policies. 
Still, it should be acknowledged that this study is limited in some ways. For one thing, the 
thesis of ethical particularism, central to liberal nationalist thought, has not been subjected to 
critical scrutiny here. Presumably, many relevant points can be made about the question 
whether certain relationships between people do indeed give rise to special moral duties; if the 
bonds of nationality can be qualified as such a relationship; and to what extent this can justify 
the exclusion of outsiders to the nation. For another thing, the conclusions of this research 
regarding the practice of restricting immigration ultimately remain fairly abstract: closing 
borders is permitted as soon as the change of national identity that immigration causes or 
requires, is too abrupt or too radical. It remains unclear, however, how it could be established 
when exactly this tipping point is reached. 
 Also, more research should be done in order to examine whether some central 
assumptions of this study are in line with empirical reality. Is it true that people can only 
process a certain degree of change in their national identity (as we presumed in the context of 
choice claim)? Can we indeed expect governments to influence this process of change (as was 
supposed in the social construct view)? If these conjectures were backed by empirical 
evidence, the conclusions of this research would gain strength. Whether or not future studies 
will address these particular issues – given current levels of public concern regarding the topic 
of immigration we may expect that this area of research will keep getting a lot of attention for 
some time to come.  
  
31 
 
LITERATURE 
 
Abizadeh, A. (2002). Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four 
Arguments. The American Political Science Review, 96(3), 495-509.  
 
Abizadeh, A. (2006). Liberal Egalitarian Arguments for Closed Borders: Some Preliminary 
Critical Reflections. Ethics and Econonomics, 4(1), 1-8. 
 
Carens, J. (1987). Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders. The Review of Politics, 
49(2), 251-273.  
 
Daniels, R. (2004). Guarding the Golden Door. New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Kymlicka, W. (2001a). Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kymlicka, W. (2001b). Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective. In D. Miller 
& S. H. Hashmi (Eds.), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (pp. 249-275). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lelieveldt, H. & Princen, S. (2011). The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Margalit, A. & Raz, J. (1990). National Self-Determination. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(9), 
439-461. 
 
Miller, D. L. (1995). On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Miller, D. L. (2000). Bounded Citizenship. In D. L. Miller (Ed.), Citizenship and National 
Identity (pp. 81-96). Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Miller, D. L. (2005). Immigration: The Case for Limits. In A. I. Cohen & C. H. Wellman 
(Eds.),  Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (pp. 193-206). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Pevnick, R. D. (2007). Social Trust and the Ethics of Immigration Policy. Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 17, 146-167. 
 
Pevnick, R. D. (2008). Justice in Immigration: Citizenship, Residence & Political Association 
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Virginia). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/304438081. 
 
Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Tamir, Y. (1993). Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
